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COMMENTS
SALE OR LEASE: CAPITAL GAIN OR ORDINARY INCOME
SUBJECT TO DEPLETION IN MINERAL TRANSACTIONS
An owner of land or a mineral interest may enter either of
two basic transactions involving the mineral rights: a sale' or a
lease. Few problems arise where the landowner or mineral
owner intends to dispose of his rights to one not normally in the
business of exploration and exploitation, who is purchasing these
rights for the purpose of speculation. However, problems do
arise in those situations in which the landowner or mineral
owner desires to enter into a transaction for the purpose of developing his property by exploration and extraction. To the extent
that the tax laws, administrative regulations, and jurisprudence
permit, the attorney for the landowner or mineral owner should
attempt to structure the transaction to obtain the most favorable
tax effect for his client. If a transaction is considered a sale, both
cash received upon execution of the contract and any subsequent
payments treated as installments will be considered the return
of capital and any gain will be capital gain. However, if it is
found that a lease is executed, the cash payment is regarded as
ordinary income in the form of advance royalty and is subject to
the applicable statutory depletion allowance. Similarly, payments made as royalties on actual production will be characterized as ordinary income subject to depletion. If there exists the
option to choose between these transactions, the ultimate result
will be determined by the knowledge and expertise of the attorney and the relative bargaining position of the client.
The jurisprudence2 reflects an inconsistency in the treatment
of functionally similar transactions which look to the development of mineral property, depending upon whether oil and gas
1. In Louisiana, it is well settled that minerals may not be owned
separate from the land of which they form a part, and any sale or reservation of mineral rights will only create a servitude giving the owner thereof
the right to go on the land to search for and reduce the minerals to
possession. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91
So. 207 (1922). This concept was applied to "hard" minerals in Lee v. Giauque,
154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923). Nevertheless, a sale for federal income tax
purposes corresponds to the creation of a mineral servitude in Louisiana
jurisprudence, and for the purposes of this paper, the term "sale" will be
used for convenience throughout.
2. Compare Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933) and Burnet v. Harmel,
287 U.S. 103 (1932) with Linehan v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1961),
Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957),
and Turner v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 970 (D. Me. 1964).
[417]
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or "hard" minerals s are involved. As a general rule in the field
of oil and gas taxation, a transaction in which the owner of mineral property transfers the property, but retains an economic
interest running for the life of the property, will be regarded as
a lease or sublease rather than a sale or assignment. Under the
basic tax treatment previously outlined, cash received on execution of the contract is taxed as ordinary income subject to depletion, and payments measured by production are treated similarly. However, hard mineral transactions with a similar economic structure have occasionally been treated as sales, with the
result that cash payments received either on execution of the
contract or on units produced have been regarded as gain realized on the sale of a capital asset.4 Two possible explanations
exist for this dichotomy. First, it might be suggested that, in
some instances at least, reserves of hard minerals can be accurately estimated with the result that the combination of cash
received on execution of the contract and payments measured by
units of production can be found to represent a fair total sales
price. Second, the statutory depletion allowances for most hard
minerals are substantially smaller than those for oil and gas.
This latter fact may have motivated some courts to permit those
persons dealing with hard minerals, particularly sand and gravel,
to obtain the benefit of capital gain treatment rather than the
less advantageous tax consequences of a lease transaction.5
This Comment will examine the jurisprudence concerning
the above-mentioned transactions by landowners or mineral
owners in regard to oil, gas, and hard mineral taxation. Recent
decisions demonstrate that the opportunity to choose between
3. The term "hard" minerals should be understood as referring to sand,
gravel, sulphur, uranium, etc., but excluding coal, timber, and domestic Iron
ore, to which special rules apply. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 631.
4. United States v. White, 311 F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1962); Linehan v.
Commissioner, 297 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1961); (Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v.
Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957); Turner v. United States, 226 F.
Supp. 970 (D. Me. 1964). See also Comment, Sale or Leasef Disparate Tax
Treatment of Mineral Transactions by Courts Based on Nature of Minerals
Involved, 42 Tsx. L. REv. 707 (1964).
5. In discussing this point, one court noted in dicta that the parties are
probably not influenced by the considerably lower statutory depletion rates
applicable to hard minerals as compared to oil and gas. United States v.
White, 401 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1968). However, that case involved uranium.
At the time of the decision, the statutory depletion rate for oil and gas was
27Y%, and the statutory allowance for uranium was 23%; thus, a difference
of only 4Y2% was involved. The difference between the statutory rate for
oil and gas and that for sand and gravel was 22%% when this cose was
decided. 83 Stat. 630 (1969), amending § 613(b), INT. REV. CODE of 1954. See
notes 44-48 tnfra and accompanying text.
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ordinary income and capital gain treatment is fast disappearing
where hard minerals are involved." It is difficult to predict
whether the opportunity to make such a choice has already been
or will in the near future be completely foreclosed. However, it
is hoped that analysis of the jurisprudence will afford some basis
for determining both the present position of the courts and the
future possibility of choosing favorable tax treatments.
Sale v. Lease in Oil and Gas Transactions
The key to determining whether the holder of a mineral
property 7 is entitled to a depletion allowance is the concept of
the economic interest. An economic interest will be found when
(1) a taxpayer has acquired an interest in minerals in place, and
(2) he secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived
from the extraction of the minerals.8 The case which first
referred to the economic interest concept was Palmer v. Bender.9
Although the precise issue was whether a transaction was an
assignment or a sublease rather than whether the transaction
was a sale or a lease, the case is nevertheless relevant to the
instant discussion. In Palmer, a mineral lessee transferred his
working interest ° to an oil company for a cash bonus, a production payment," and an overriding royalty. 12 At issue was the
6. See note 43 infra and accompanying text. Accord, Rutledge v. United
States, 428 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1970); Wood v. United States, 377 F.2d 300
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977, decided with United States v. Peeler,
377 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 and United States v. Green,

377 F.2d 550 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 978 (1967); United States v.
Witte, 306 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 949 (1963); Albritton
v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957).
7. A mineral property is each separate interest owned by the taxpayer
in each mineral deposit in each separate tract or parcel of land. INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 614(a).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1965).
9. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).

10. A working interest is the mineral interest, plus all of the costs and
expenses necessary to bring the minerals to the surface, less all productionmeasured payments, such as royalties and production payments. 4C. BREEDING
& A. BURTON, INcOME TAXATION oF NATURAL RESOURCES § 2.04 (1971).
11. A production payment is a right to the minerals in place entitling
its owner to a specified percentage of production for either a specific period
of time or until a certain sum of money or quantity of materials has been
received. Id. § 2.07. A production payment may or may not be an economic
interest. See note 21 infra. See also notes 22-26 infra. Cf. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 12626 (1971).
12. The overriding royalty is similar in many respects to the royalty
Interest, except that the overriding royalty is created out of the working
interest and is a burden on that interest. C. BREEDING & A. BURTON, INCOME
TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES § 2.05 (1971).
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proper tax treatment of these receipts by the transferor. The
Supreme Court held that the taxpayer must have an economic
interest in the minerals in place to be entitled to depletion; since
the transferor did have such an economic interest, the transaction was a sublease rather than an assignment. 18
The early cases state that where the owner of a mineral
property disposes of such property, but retains an economic
interest running for the life of the property, the transaction is a
lease or a sublease.1 4 However, if the retained economic interest
does not have a life coterminous with that of the property, a different result obtains under the early decision of Commissioner v.
Fleming.15 In that case, the working interest of a lease was sold
for cash, but a production payment was retained. The only distinction between Fleming and Palmer, therefore, was that in
Fleming no overriding royalty was retained. However, the court
in Fleming split the transaction into two parts: the sale of the
working interest for cash and the receipt of a production payment. The cash received from the sale of the working interest
which was not connected with any production was treated as the
sale of any other vendible real property and qualified for capital
gain treatment. The production payment was viewed as an economic interest, and, therefore, the income received to pay it was
ordinary income subject to depletion.
Thus, the following distinctions can be observed:
(1) When the disposition is made without the retention
of any economic interest, the transaction is considered a sale
and any realized gain qualifies as capital gain.
13. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557 (1933):

"The language of the

[depletion] statute is broad enough to provide, at least, for every case in
which the taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any interest in the oil in
place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from
the extraction of oil, to which he must look for a return of his capital....
[Tihe lessor's right to a depletion allowance does not depend upon his
retention of ownership or any other particular form of legal interest In the
mineral content of the land. It Is enough if, by virtue of the leasing transaction, he has retained a right to share in the oil produced. If so, he has an
economic interest in the oil, in place, which is depleted by production."
14. Id.; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932). In the Burnet case, the

taxpayer received a cash bonus plus a royalty Interest running for the life
of the property. This was all held to be ordinary income subject to depletion,
and the cash bonus was merely viewed as advance royalty. A royalty interest
Is a right to in-place minerals allowing the owner of the interest a specified

percentage of production with none of the expense. C. BREEDING & A. BURTON,
INcOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES § 2.03 (1971).

Unlike a production

payment, a royalty interest is always an economic Interest. Cf. note 11 supra.
15. 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
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(2) When the disposition is made with the retention of
an economic interest running for the life of the property
(e.g., a royalty or overriding royalty interest), the transaction is classified as a lease.16 Cash received upon execution
of the contract is treated as advance royalty,'17 and royalty
income of whatever nature is ordinary income subject to
depletion. 18
(3) When the disposition is made with the retention
of an economic interest for a period less than the life of the
property (e.g., a production payment), the transaction is
divided into two parts: the cash received on the sale not tied
to production, representing gain from the sale of the working
interest, is capital gain; the income to pay off the production
payment, being in satisfaction of an economic interest, is
ordinary income subject to depletion. 19
The 1969 Tax Reform Act 20 made no change in the sale-lease
classifications outlined above. However, whereas before 1969
all production payments were regarded as economic interests,
under Internal Revenue Code section 63621 a production payment
16. See, e.g., Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946);
Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932);
Commissioner v. Pickard, 401 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1968).
17. See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Campbell v. Fasken,
267 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1959).
18. See, e.g., Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel,
287 U.S. 103 (1932); Commissioner v. Pickard, 401 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1968).
19. See, e.g., Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Thomas v.
Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937); United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.
1963); Commissioner v. Fleming, 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
20. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 630.
21. 83 Stat. 630 (1969), adding § 636, INT. REV. CODE of 1954: "Income tax
treatment of mineral production payments."
"(a) CARVED-OUT PRODUCTION PAYMENT.-A production payment carved out
of mineral property shall be treated, for purposes of this subtitle, as if it
were a mortgage loan on the property, and shall not qualify as an economic
Interest in the mineral property. In the case of a production payment carved
out for exploration or development of a mineral property, the preceding
sentence shall apply only if and to the extent gross income from the property (for purposes of section 613) would be realized, in the absence of the
application of such sentence, by the person creating the production payment.
"(b) RETAINED PRODUCTION PAYMENT ON SALE OF MINERAL PROPERTY.-A production payment retained on the sale of a mineral property shall be treated,
for purposes of this subtitle, as if it were a purchase money mortgage loan
and shall not qualify as an economic interest in the mineral property.
O(c)RETAINED PRODUCTION PAYMENT ON LEASE OF MINERAL PROPERTY.-A pro-

duction payment retained in a mineral property by the lessor In a leasing
transaction shall be treated, for purposes of this subtitle, insofar as the
lessee

(or his successors in

interest) is concerned, as if it

were a bonus

granted by the lessee to the lessor payable In installments. The treatment of
the production payment in the hand of the lessor shall be determined without regard to the provisions of this subsection.
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qualifies as an economic interest in only two situations:
(1) where a carved-out production payment is pledged to the
exploration or development of the property and otherwise meets
the requirements of sections 636(a) and 613;22 or (2) where the
production payment is retained by the lessor in a leasing transaction. 23 If retained on a sale of a mineral property, a production
24
payment is now treated as a purchase money mortgage loan,
not as an economic interest as in Fleming. The practical consequence of this is that it is the debtor of the production payment,
not the creditor, who must report the income from the production
payment and who is allowed depletion. The creditor now gets
capital gain treatment not only on the cash received upon execution of the contract, but also on the cash received to pay off the
production payment because this no longer qualifies as an economic interest. Simply stated, under Internal Revenue Code subsection 636 (b), the purchaser of property burdened with a
retained production payment is considered to have purchased
the entire property, and the income allocable to the retained
production payment must now be included in the purchaser's
income with all of the attendant consequences. The avowed
purpose for adding this section to the Code was to destroy the
opportunity which formerly existed under the A-B-C transaction: 25 to purchase a mineral property at a low basis and to
exclude the substantial amounts of production necessary to pay
off the retained production payment from the purchaser's income
26
stream.
"(d) DEFINITION.-AS used in this section, the term 'mineral property' has
the meaning assigned to the term 'property' in section 614(a).
"(e) REOULATIONs.-The Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section."
22. 83 Stat. 630 (1969), adding § 636(a), INT. REV. CODE of 1954. See generally Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(b) (1), 36 Fed. Reg. 12626 (1971).
23. 83 Stat. 630 (1969), adding § 636(c), INT. REV. CODE of 1954. See gener-

ally Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.636-2(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 12626 (1971).
24. 83 Stat. 630 (1969), adding § 636(b), INT. REV. CODE of 1954.

25. Although there were many varieties, the basic A-B-C transaction
Involved the sale of the working interest by A to B, the developer, for cash
plus a retained production payment. Under Fleming, the cash received upon
execution qualified for capital gain treatment. A would later sell the production payment to C and would be allowed to take capital gain treatment as
on the sale of any other capital asset. B would have the benefit of a very
low depletable basis. C would realize income on the difference between the
purchase price and the maturity value of the production payment and, in
addition, would be able to exclude a substantial portion of this income as
depletion.
26. See generally Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(a)(2), 36 Fed. Reg.
12624-5 (1971); C. BREEDING & A. BURTON, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES §§ 3.03, 6.19 (1971); Lane, The Effect of the Tax Reform Act on the
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Various attempts have been made to manipulate tax treatment by changing the legal structure of oil and gas transactions.
However, attempted juggling of the sale-lease distinction has
generally failed, and the courts have adhered to the time-honored
principle that substance, not form, must govern in matters of
federal income taxation. For example, the disposition of a mineral property subject to a retained production payment of such
size that it could not possibly pay out within the life of the property in question has been treated as a sublease rather than a
sale.2 7 One of the most interesting attempts to disguise a lease
as a sale occurred in Campbell v. Fasken.28 In that case, the landowners conveyed an undivided forty-five percent interest in all
of the minerals under their lands to three oil companies. The
agreements provided for the payment of a sum of money to the
landowners and an obligation on the part of the oil companies
to commence drilling within thirty days. Should any of these
wells be completed, the landowners were to pay fifty-five percent
of the drilling expenses, not to exceed $25,000. In reporting their
federal income tax, the landowners treated the amounts received
upon execution of the contracts and upon delivery of the mineral
deeds to the oil companies as capital gain. The amounts received
on their share of production were treated as ordinary income
subject to depletion. The Fifth Circuit, relying on the principle
that the substance rather than the form of transactions controls
their classification, held that the agreement was a leasing transaction, and thus the cash received on execution of the contract
amounted to an advance royalty. 29 One of the more interesting
aspects of the decision is that the court appears to have disregarded the parties' contemplation of development, which should
be a determinative factor in characterizing the transaction as a
lease rather than a sale. This would have no application to those
situations in which the transaction involves a firm which intends
to conduct exploration and exploitation operations on the land;
Investor in Oil and Gas, 23 MAJoR TAX PLANNING 673, 683 (1971); Effect of

Tax Reform Act of 1969 on Taxation of Oil and Gas and Mining Transactions, 10 OI. & GAS TAX Q. 79, 87 (L. Fiske ed. 1970).

27. United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1963).

28. 267 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1959).
29. Campbell v. Fasken, 267 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1959). The dissenting judge

took the occasion to point out that the lessor reserving a royalty interest
receives this free of cost and that all the landowners had left after entering
this agreement was 55% of the minerals, whereas they owned all the minerals before transaction. He was of the opinion that the landowners had sold
45% of the minerals under their land. Id. at 797.
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however, in those situations alluded to above where the transaction is made with one who intends to hold the property for
speculative purposes, this decision indicates that the intention of
the parties insofar as development is concerned is immaterial.
Thus, a transaction which the landowner or mineral owner genuinely intends to be a sale may nevertheless be characterized as
a lease for tax purposes.
It can therefore be observed that the oil and gas jurisprudence has been consistent in applying the principle that the
retention of an economic interest running for the life of the property, whether that interest be an overriding royalty, a lessor's
royality, or a net profits interest, 30 will characterize the transaction as a lease or sublease, rather than a sale. Additionally, the
concept that substance and not form must govern tax consequences has been honored.
Sale v. Lease in Hard Mineral Transactions
In Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner,8' the
landowner and a firm entered into an agreement termed a "Contract of Sale" for the purpose of extracting the sand and gravel
under the landowner's property. The landowner was to receive a
cash payment upon execution and at each anniversary of the
contract, with the amount of the advance payment being recovered from production before any additional amounts were due
the landowner. Taking full recognition of the oil and gas jurisprudence and the fact that the landowner did have an interest
in production, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless held the transaction
to be a sale because the landowner had no remaining economic
interest in the property. The court used language which could
be taken to mean that, unlike the oil and gas cases, form rather
than substance could control tax consequences. 2 Albritton v.
30. A net profits interest, for federal tax purposes, is a share of gross
production measured by net profits from operation of the property. Like
the overriding royalty in that it is created from the working interest, the net
profits interest differs from other production-measured payments in that it
represents a fractional share of the profit of the operating company, rather
than a fractional share of the minerals themselves as produced. C. BREEDING
& A. BURTON, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES § 2.06 (1971).

31. 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957).
32. Id. at 866: "Like the minority [in the Tax Court], we do not find
the arguments of the commissioner and the majority or the cases, involving
oil and gas and other mineral leases, cited by them persuasive of the commissioner's contention that Crowell did not make a sale but only executed
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Commissioner,3s decided later in the same year by the same circuit, held that the landowners had entered into a mineral lease
by retaining a royalty interest running for the life of the property. The importance of this case is that it distinguishes rather
than overrules Crowell,3 4 and that it lists the relevant factors in
35
distinguishing a sale from a lease.
More recently the Fifth Circuit, in three cases 6 decided on
the same day, indicated that it was moving in the direction of
applying the well-settled oil and gas jurisprudence in hard mineral cases. In the only one of the three rendered with a full written opinion, Wood v. United States,37 the court was construing
a mineral lease with a reserved royalty. Indeed, we think that an analysis
of the contract of sale and of what was to be, and was, done under it
completely rebuts the commissioner's theory that the arrangement was
merely one of lease, under which Crowell retained an economic interest
within the meaning of the cases the commissioner cites and relies on. The
instrument, unlike a mineral lease where the main purpose is development,
undertook as its main purposes to convey the entire interest of Crowell
for a price to be determined as fixed in it and to be paid in cash in installments. There was no provision or suggestion in it for the retention and
payment of a royalty as in oil and gas leases. A bona fide sale was the
intent of the parties and it was expressed in terms free from ambiguity
throughout the instrument in the provisions and conditions it set out.
Looking to the actual circumstances as well as the language of the contract
of sale, there is no occasion or basis for resorting to legal niceties of interpretation to defeat the basic purposes and effect of the transaction."
33. 248 F.2d 49 (5th Or. 1957).
34. Albritton v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 49, 51-52 (5th Cir. 1957): "[C onstruing the instrument [in Crowell] as a whole and considering it against
the total background of transactions under it, the contract was one of sale.
Applying the same tests, we hold that the contracts here are leases of the
right to remove sand and gravel, yielding to the landowners nothing but
royalty."
35. The five factors given by the court were (1) a contract styled a
"Contract of Sale"; (2) parties called "vendor" and "vendee"; (3) vendor
received a stipulated price per ton, rather than a percentage of sales, indicating that the landowner's receipts are not dependent on the developer's
income; (4) production was neither required nor declared to be the central
purpose of the contract; and (5) vendee's obligation to reconvey the property
at the end of a specific term. Id. at 51, n.7 It cannot be denied that all of
the factors listed above were present in Crowell, but they also indicate the
apparent tendency of the court to lend credulity to form over substance.
In addition, the final factor can hardly be considered of determinative
import since it would be difficult to conceive of a case where a landowner
would be willing to part with the ownership of his land in any mineral
transaction for the amount he receives as consideration for entering into
the agreement. Further, it would appear that whether the landowner's
compensation is based on a price per ton rather than on a percentage of
sales is a specious distinction inasmuch as production will eventually get
into the income stream of the development company.
36. Wood v. United States, 377 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967); United States v. Peeler, 377 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967); United States v. Green, 377 F.2d 550 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 978 (1967).
37. 377 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
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a contract, termed a lease, which provided for advance yearly
payments to be recouped from production before any additional
amounts were due the lessor. The court recognized that the
applicable test for determining whether a contract is a sale or
a lease is the economic interest test as developed in the oil and
gas cases. Consequently, the court held that the royalty interest
retained by the lessor was an economic interest running for the
life of the property, and therefore, that the transaction was taxable as a lease. The facts which really put at issue the distinction between the two lines of jurisprudence arose in Rutledge v.
United States.8 In this case the parties had forsaken a lease
agreement to enter into a transaction which tracked the Crowell
agreement for the purpose of attaining capital gains.3 9 The landowners' compensation under both agreements consisted of
monthly advance payments to be recouped from production
before additional payments were due the landowners. Again the
court avoided overruling the Crowell decision, although that
decision was squarely in controversy. However, the court did
follow the Wood decision, holding that the transaction, though
termed a sale, was a lease because the landowners had retained
an economic interest which was coterminous with the mineral
40
property.
42
Presently, all of the circuits, except the First 4' and Fifth,
accord in holding that a transaction in which a landowner retains
an economic interest running for the life of a hard mineral property will be regarded as a lease and that, similar to the oil and
gas cases, substance rather than form controls federal tax conse38. 428 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1970).
39. The brief filed by the landowners Indicated that although the stan-

dard form leasing transaction was more beneficial to them, they had entered
into the Crowell transaction to be able to obtain capital gains treatment,
and it was the parties' intention to transfer title to the mineral deposit.
Brief for Appellees at 3, 6-7, Rutledge v.
1970). To the contrary, the government
view of the confusion existing in other
implicitly overruling Crowell. Brief for

United States, 428 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.
urged the overruling of Crowell In
circuits which had viewed Wood as
Appellants at 16, id. The decisions

referred to by the government were Oliver v. United States, 408 F.2d 769 (4th
Cir. 1969) and Alkire v. Riddell, 397 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1968).

For a discussion

of these latter two cases, see note 43 infra.
40. Rutledge v. United States, 428 F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1970). The court
specifically held that Wood, not Crowell, controlled, and that Crowell was
distinguishable from the instant case because the economic realities involved
In Rutledge required that legal niceties of interpretation, unnecessary in

Crowell, be used to pierce the intent of the parties to reach the realities
underlying the transaction. Id. at 352-53.
41. See notes 49 and 50 infra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 31-40 supra and accompanying text.
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quences.4 The White cases illustrate how the Tenth Circuit
overruled a prior decision dealing with hard minerals when it
appeared incorrect, based on contemporary oil and gas jurisprudence. In White v. United States44 an amateur geologist discovered a uranium deposit on the taxpayers' land and purchased a
mineral deed from them for $175,000 cash plus ten percent of the
gross production. The Tenth Circuit viewed the contract as one
of speculation because the vendee was free to explore or refrain
therefrom, at his discretion. The transaction was split into two
parts as was done by the Fifth Circuit in Commissioner v. Fleming,45 and the court refused to accept the government's position
that because the taxpayers had retained an economic interest
running for the life of the property they should pay taxes at
ordinary rates subject to depletion. Maintaining that the issue
of the proper tax treatment of royalty receipts would be settled
if and when there was production, the court held that the $175,000 represented the sales price of the mineral deed and was
therefore capital gain. Six years later, the court was faced with
the proper treatment of the royalty payments because production
43. The decisions of the various circuits on this point are: Royalton
Stone Corp. v. Commissioner, 379 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
978 (1967) (contract for removal of sand and gravel was in terms of a sale
but landowner retained a royalty; held, transaction was a lease); Laudenslager v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 947
(1963) (landowner agreed to furnish landfill for a specified royalty with the
advance payments to be recouped from production; held, based on economic
interest test this was a lease); Oliver v. United States, 408 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.
1969) (developer given a specific period to remove sand and gravel in return
for a royalty to landowner; held, since landowner retained an economic
interest running for the life of the contract, the transaction was a lease);
Belknap v. United States, 406 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1969) (landowners were getting monthly advances on account of limestone to be mined from their land
plus a royalty for anything over the minimum: held, per curiam, a lease);
Schreiber v. United States, 382 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1967) (landowner's agreement for extraction of sand and gravel stipulated a yearly minimum to be
paid in advance plus a royalty for production in excess of the minimum;
held, landowner's compensation depended upon production, therefore a
-lease); Rabiner v. Bacon, 373 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1967) (landowner entered a
transaction termed a lease for the extraction of sand and gravel from his
property for a royalty; held, under the economic interest test this was a
lease because the landowner's compensation depended solely upon production); Alkire v. Riddell, 397 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1968) (taxpayer transferred
sand and gravel leases he owned when he sold his business, and received a
royalty as consideration; held, the transaction was a lease insofar as it
related to the transfer of the lease); United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610
(10th Cir. 1968) (landowners transferred by way of a mineral deed any
uranium deposits underlying their land for cash bonus and a royalty; held,
this is a lease because landowners were looking to development for compensation).
44. 311 F.2d 399 (10th Cir. 1962).
45. 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936). See note 15 supra and accompanying
text.
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had, in fact, resulted. In United States v. White,46 the court recognized that no practical reason existed for treating structurally
similar transactions differently depending on the type of minerals involved. In reversing its prior decision, the court held
that it was improper to have originally split the transaction. The
retention of an economic interest running for the life of the property colored the entire transaction as one of lease based on the
8 decisions.
Burnet47 and Palmer"
The leading case in the First Circuit is Linehan v. Commissioner,49 a decision in which the court felt controlled by the
Crowell case. This case apparently represents the current position of that circuit. 5° As outlined previously, 5' the position of
the Fifth Circuit in regard to the classification of hard mineral
transactions remains unsettled. Crowell is still viable in that it
has not yet been specifically overruled. This suggests the availability of choosing tax treatment through careful structuring.
However, later decisions like Wood and Rutledge indicate that if
this opportunity exists it is very narrowly confined. It is submitted that if Crowell is to be applied in the future, not only will
the five tests of Albritton have to be met, 52 but it also must
clearly appear to the court that the realities of the situation do
not command that legal niceties of interpretation be resorted to
in order to find the true substance of the transaction.s
Conclusion
Obviously, the opportunities for choosing tax consequences
in the area of oil and gas taxation are limited by the concepts
which were developed early in that jurisprudence. Retention of
an economic interest running for the life of the property marks
46. 401 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1968).
47. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932). See notes 14 and 16-18 supra
and accompanying text.
48. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933). See notes 9-13, 16, and 18
supra and accompanying text.
49. 297 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1961).
50. Turner v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 970 (D. Me. 1964), cited Zinehan
as controlling and held a transaction to be a sale where the parties were
called lessor and lessee and compensation was based on a fixed price per
cubic yard removed.
51. See notes 31-40 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 35 supra.
53. This last hurdle is the result of the decision in Rutledge. See note
40 supra. This would seem to indicate clearly that the parties must originally enter a transaction styled a sale, because if a lease is abandoned to
enter a sale for the purpose of attaining capital gain treatment, the court
will feel free to examine the intent of the parties.
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the transaction as a lease or a sublease, and substance rather
than form governs tax consequences. No variation from this
theme is apparent, even in light of the confusion in the hard
mineral jurisprudence.
54
The Fifth Circuit's ambivalence in the hard mineral cases
is directly attributable to that court's failure to overrule its
55
decision in Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner.
Crowell does not command allegiance except in the First Circuit,5 6 and it now appears that the circuit which gave it life
honors it more in its breach than its observance. 57 Because the
case is decided incorrectly when judged by contemporary oil and
gas jurisprudence, because the case clearly represents the minority viewpoint, and because the case is inconsistent with later
cases in the hard mineral jurisprudence, it is submitted that
Crowell should be dealt a swift death rather than slowly strangled by tenuous distinctions. The fact that the hard mineral
developer or owner has a less favorable statutory depletion
allowances should not be sufficient reason for different classifi5 9
cations of functionally similar transactions.

Some certainty will obviously be afforded by the enactment
of Internal Revenue Code subsections 636 (b) and (c),60 provided
these subsections are applied consistently with the economic
interest test. Assuming the transaction to be a sale, 1 Internal
54. See notes 31-40 and 51-53 supra.
55. 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957).

56. See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra.
57. See, e.g., Rutledge v. United States, 428 F.2d 347 (5th Mr. 1970); Wood
v. United States, 377 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967),
decided with United States v. Peeler, 377 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967), and United States v. Green, 377 F.2d 550 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 978 (1967) ; United States v. Witte, 306 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 949 (1963); Albritton v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 49 (5th

Cir. 1957).
58. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
59. See Comment, Sale or Leasef Disparate Tax Treatment of Mineral
Transactions by Courts Based on Nature of Minerals Involved, 42 TEXAS L.

REv. 707 (1964).

See also notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text dealing

with the Tenth Circuit's decisions in the White cases.

60. 83 Stat. 630 (1969), adding § 636(b), (C), INT. REv. CODE of 1954, quoted
fully at note 21 supra.
61. In

C.

BREEDING & A.

BURTON,

INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL

RESOURCES

§ 3.03 (1971), the authors give three situations in which a transaction will be
considered a sale: (1) when the owner of a property assigns all or part of
that property retaining, if only a partial assignment, an interest identical to
that assigned except for size; (2) when the owner of a working interest
retains that interest but assigns any type of continuing, non-operating interest; and (3) when the owner of a continuing property interest assigns that
interest but retains a non-continuing interest in production.
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Revenue Code section 636 (b) provides that a production payment retained by the landowner-vendor is a purchase money
mortgage loan and does not qualify as an economic interest. The
62
tax consequences of this change have been discussed previously.
8
Assuming the existence of a leasing transaction, the lessor who
has retained a production payment is considered as having
retained an economic interest in the property. Subsection 636 (c)
makes no change where a production payment is retained in a
leasing transaction. The lessor may treat both the cash received
upon execution of the contract and the cash received from any
production-based payments as ordinary income subject to depletion. The lessee is able to exclude from his income the amounts
necessary to compensate the lessor for production-based payments, but he must capitalize any bonus and recover it through
depletion. 4 In the future, therefore, it appears that the determination of whether a transaction will be taxed as a subsection
636 (b) sale or as a subsection 636 (c) lease will be made in accordance with the type of economic interest which is involved. It is
submitted that if the courts use the provisions of Internal Revenue Code section 636 together with the economic interest test as
it developed in the oil and gas jurisprudence, there will result
both certainty and uniformity in differentiating a sale from a
lease in all mineral transactions6 5
Although this approach adequately resolves the former problem of different tax treatments for structurally identical transactions, a rigid, mechanistic approach may be damaging from
another viewpoint. It would not be hard to imagine a situation
62. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
63. A transaction will be considered as a lease or a sublease in any case
where the owner of the operating rights, i.e., the landowner or working
interest owner, assigns all or a portion of these rights while retaining a continuing, non-operating interest in production. C. BREEDING & A. BURTON,
INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES § 3.02 (1971).
64. C. BREEDING & A. BURTON, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES §
6.20 (1971); Lane, The Effect of the Tax Reform Act on the Investor in Oil
and Gas, 23 MAJOR TAX PLANNING 673, 688 (1971); Effect of Tax Reform Act
of 1969 on Taxation of Oil and Gas and Mining Transactions, 19 OIL & GAS
TAX Q. 79, 88 (L. Fiske ed. 1970); accord, Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.636-2(a)
and (b), 36 Fed. Reg. 12626 (1971).
65. Thus, if the court finds that an economic interest has been retained

which is coterminous with the property, notwithstanding that another economic interest has been retained which is not coterminous, the transaction
should be classified as a leasing transaction and governed by Internal Reve-

nue Code subsection 636(c).

However, if the court finds the only economic

interest retained is one that. lasts for a period of time less than the life of

the property, the transaction should be classified a sale and governed by
Internal Revenue Code subsection 636(b).
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in which, as a matter of complete speculation, a landowner disposes of his mineral interest to a person who has no intention of
developing the property and retains an economic interest running
for the life of the property in addition to the cash received upon
execution of the contract. In such a situation, both parties really
intend a sale, and both realize that there is no present prospect
of development. It would seem unfair and totally unrealistic
under these circumstances to cause the entire proceeds to be
taxed as ordinary income subject to depletion merely because
the transferor retains an economic interest running for the life
of the property; the transaction should be taxed as what it clearly
is, a sale. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that when the
federal courts are, in the future, presented with the problem of
whether a particular transaction is a sale or a lease, the realities
of the situation should govern the outcome rather than the
unbending economic interest test. This is nothing more than an
application of the maxim that substance rather than form should
control federal tax consequences.
Chris A. Verret

UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN LOUISIANA
By Act 187 of 1962, the Louisiana Insurance Code was
amended to require that all automobile liability insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery in Louisiana contain an uninsured motorist provision.1 Under such provision, the insured,
when injured by an uninsured motorist, can recover from his
own insurer damages for bodily injury, sickness, disease, or
death to the same extent that he would be legally entitled to
recover from the uninsured motorist. However, certain policies
are not required to have uninsured motorist coverage. As provided in the statute, the insured may validly reject such coverage.2 Further, the statute does not apply to policies issued
1. LA. R.S. 22:1406D (Supp. 1962). Although there should be little difference in wording from policy to policy, there is such a possibility, especially
if out of state cases or treatises are examined. Because the uninsured motorist provision is a contract, the wording generally governs and a difference
in wording may have great Impact. Therefore, care should be exercised In
studying the wording of each policy.
2. Id. D(1) reads in part: "[P]rovided, however, that the coverage required under this section shall not be applicable where any Insured named
In the policy shall reject the coverage." Soileau v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 182 So.2d 76 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). As this Is the only case in

